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Notes 
Repercussions of China’s High-Tech Rise: 
Protection and Enforcement of  
Intellectual Property Rights in China 
Emily Gische* 
China’s growing technological prowess and role as a global economic player has vastly 
increased the number of U.S. and international companies doing business in China. 
Despite the country’s continued building of a basic intellectual property infrastructure, 
IP violations remain a common complaint of foreign businesses. This Note analyzes 
China’s developing IP policy in the context of World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement 362, which the United States initiated against China in 2007. The dispute 
concerned the protection and enforcement of IP rights and involved both copyright and 
trademark issues. This Note also examines subsequent national IP strategy 
pronouncements issued by both China’s State Council and China’s highest court, the 
Supreme People’s Court, to assess the extent to which they remedy the issues that arose 
in the WTO dispute. In addition to these materials, this Note analyzes the likelihood 
that China will be able to implement its IP strategy. This Note concludes that although 
the Chinese government is shifting to a more proactive IP policy, the lack of effective 
law enforcement continues to serve as a major obstacle to implementation. Nascent 
pressure from domestic IP creators, international pressure, and most important, 
changes in China’s domestic economy all act as counterbalancing forces to offset the 
enforcement problem. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. B.A., Stanford 
University, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Keith Hand for his invaluable feedback throughout 
the Note-writing process, the editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their work on this Note, 
and my family for their constant love and support. 
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Introduction 
Intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) in China have consistently 
been a priority for the United States in recent years. On April 10, 2007, 
the United States filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), requesting consultations with China concerning the protection 
and enforcement of IPRs.1 The complaint involved both copyright and 
trademark issues. The dispute, known as Dispute Settlement 362 
(“DS362”), concerned: (1) the thresholds that must be met in order for 
certain acts of trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy to be 
 
 1. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, ¶ 1.1, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009). To ensure compliance with its agreements, the 
WTO operates a dispute settlement mechanism, which consists of a two-tiered international tribunal 
that determines if violations of WTO law have occurred and authorizes trade sanctions against those 
who do not remedy their violations. Jan Bohanes & Adrian Emch, WTO-China IPR Case: A Mixed 
Result, China L. & Prac., Mar. 16, 2009, at 19. If a WTO member believes that another member’s 
conduct is in violation of WTO rules, that WTO member can bring its case to a panel of experts that 
adjudicates impartially on the basis of WTO law. Id. 
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subject to criminal procedures and penalties (the “criminal prosecution 
thresholds claim”); (2) goods that infringe IPRs and that are confiscated 
by Chinese customs authorities, particularly the disposal of such goods 
following removal of their infringing features (the “customs measures 
claim”); and (3) the denial of copyright and related rights protection and 
enforcement for creative works of authorship, sound recordings, and 
performances that have not been authorized for publication or 
distribution within China (the “copyright law claim”).2 The first claim 
concerned criminal prosecution thresholds in both trademark and 
copyright matters, the second concerned mainly trademark infringement, 
and the third exclusively involved copyright protection.3 On January 26, 
2009, the Dispute Panel Report was made public.4 Neither China nor the 
United States appealed.5 China accepted the findings and negotiated with 
the United States to implement them by March 2010.6 
After the United States filed its complaint in 2007, China issued 
several official pronouncements regarding its IP policy. On June 5, 2008, 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) issued the 
“Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy.”7 The Outline 
covered a wide range of IPR issues, from encouraging the 
commercialization and utilization of IPRs to improving IP law 
enforcement.8 After the Outline was issued, the Supreme People’s Court 
(“SPC”) of the PRC set forth several opinions, notices, and circulars 
relating to IPRs in 2009 and 2010.9 
 
 2. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2.2–2.4. 
 3. Id. 
 4. China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
World Trade Org. (May 26, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (Issued by the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China on June 5, 2008), Chinese Gov’t’s Official Web Portal (June 21, 2008), 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm [hereinafter Outline]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Standards Concerning Jurisdiction of 
the Grassroots People’s Courts over Intellectual Property Civil Cases of First Instance (promulgated 
by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 28, 2010) (iSinoLaw) (China); Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Division of Work in the Trial of Administrative Intellectual Property Cases 
Involving the Authorization and Determination of Rights over Patent, Trademark, etc. (adopted by 
the 1469th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court, June 22, 2009) 
(Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://eng.chinalawinfo.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=law&sen= 
rLdDdW4drLdDdWrdrhdydWdd/Dd6dW4d9DdxdWcdrLdGdWud/ddFdWhd/DdwdWudrhdDdWdd
9D7vdCrdId7Xdmrdsd7MdCydHD7FdWudrDd5dWLd/Ld+&Id=7724&; Notice of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Issuing the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning Intellectual Property Trials 
Serving the Overall Objective Under the Current Economic Situation (promulgated by the Supreme 
People’s Court, Apr. 21, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter Apr. 21, 2009 SPC Notice], 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7703; Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Mar. 29, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China), 
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Using the issues in DS362 as a framework, this Note analyzes 
China’s developing IP policy. This Note also examines the Outline and 
SPC materials in the context of DS362 to determine to what extent 
China’s IP strategy and specific requirements remedy any of these issues. 
In addition to analyzing the Outline and SPC materials, this Note 
provides an analysis of how likely it is that the PRC will be able to 
implement these overall goals. 
Examination of the Outline and related SPC materials indicates that 
China’s IP policy is becoming more proactive and pro-innovation, 
especially with regard to its trademark policy, as the country focuses its 
efforts on creating a high-tech economy. Although the Chinese 
government is shifting to this proactive policy in terms of its national 
pronouncements, the lack of effective law enforcement continues to serve 
as a major obstacle to full implementation of its IPR goals. However, 
nascent pressure from domestic IP creators, international pressure 
(especially from the United States), and changes in China’s domestic 
economy act as counterbalancing forces to help offset the enforcement 
problem. As China continues to grow and become an integral part of the 
world economy, it becomes increasingly important for China and the rest 
of the international community, especially the United States, to be able 
to do business together without rampant IP violations. 
This Note is divided into five parts. Part I provides a brief 
background of China’s IP law development. Part II discusses the three 
claims in DS362. Part III sets forth China’s immediate and concrete 
implementation of the adopted WTO recommendations and reports. 
Part IV analyzes China’s response and identification of the overall issues 
that DS362 raised. Finally, Part V examines the implementation—and 
potential roadblocks—of the goals set forth in the Outline and SPC 
materials. 
I.  The Development of Intellectual Property Law 
in China 
IP law and policy in China is, for the most part, a relatively recent 
development. Most of the relevant progress has occurred within the past 
thirty years.10 Following China’s reform and opening policy post-Mao, 
the country began developing its IP law system, resulting in the creation 
of the Trademark, Patent, and Copyright Laws.11 China also joined all of 
 
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7546 [hereinafter Mar. 29, 2009 
SPC Opinion].  
 10. Andrea Wechsler, Intellectual Property Law in the P.R. China: A Powerful Economic 
Tool for Innovation and Development 32 (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop., Competition & Tax L., 
Research Paper No. 09-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354546. 
 11. See Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress, Aug. 23, 1982) (last amended Oct. 27, 2001), 
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the major IPR conventions, including the World Intellectual Property 
Organization—a specialized agency of the United Nations—in 1980 and 
the Berne Convention in 1992.12 
Scholars have posited several motivations on China’s part for 
creating and developing a comprehensive IP protection system. One such 
motivation was to facilitate foreign investment.13 China and the 
international community alike assumed that the introduction of IP 
protection standards would help boost economic growth within the 
country.14 An additional motivation was external and foreign pressure 
that led to IP reform, namely the prospect of joining the international 
trade community through membership in the WTO.15 Because China 
joined the WTO in 200116—several years after its initial creation of IP 
laws—this prospect was a significant motivation for China to continue to 
develop and amend its IP system. In addition to possible WTO 
membership, the United States was a constant force in spurring increased 
protection of foreign IP interests in China.17 
The prospect of WTO accession has resulted in concrete IP 
developments within China. China has made several efforts to ensure 
compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) as a result of its WTO accession.18 TRIPS 
provides a legal framework for protection of IPRs by incorporating the 
principles of other major international conventions and prescribing 
certain procedures and remedies that WTO members must make 
available to its domestic IPR holders.19 In this vein, China made 
amendments to all of its major IP laws, including the Patent Law in 2000, 
the Trademark Law in 2001, and the Copyright Law in 2001.20 For 
 
available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm; Patent Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (promulgated by the Fourth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National 
People’s Congress, Mar. 12, 1984) (last amended Dec. 27, 2008), available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/ 
laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html; Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Fifteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s 
Congress, Sept. 7, 1990) (last amended Oct. 27, 2001), available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/ 
laws/laws10.htm [hereinafter Copyright Law 2001]. 
 12. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 32. 
 13. Veronica Weinstein & Dennis Fernandez, Recent Developments in China’s Intellectual 
Property Laws, 3 Chinese J. Int’l L. 227, 228 (2004); Julia Ya Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on 
China’s Legal System: Trade, Investment and Beyond 20–22 (Wayne St. U. L. Sch. Legal Stud., 
Research Paper Series No. 07-15, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=985321. 
 14. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 35. 
 15. Id. at 37; see Qin, supra note 13, at 20. 
 16. Member Information: China and the WTO, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited May 1, 2012). 
 17. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 37. 
 18. Qin, supra note 13, at 21. 
 19. Id. at 20–21. 
 20. Id. at 21. 
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example, the Patent Law was modified to shift the burden of proof of 
infringement to the defendant, as required by TRIPS.21 The Trademark 
Law was amended to protect prior rights in order to implement the 
corresponding TRIPS requirement.22 The Copyright Law was modified to 
extend the owner’s rights to include the right to limit online transmission 
of the copyrighted material.23 Specific IP violations have been added to 
the criminal code, as have administrative and civil remedies, and a 
special IP adjudication division has been created in the People’s Courts.24 
Despite these developments and basic IP protection infrastructure, 
IP violations are still a major problem in China today. Such violations 
remain one of the most frequently cited complaints of foreign companies 
doing business in China.25 Most recently, the U.S. clean energy company 
American Superconductor brought suit against Chinese wind turbine 
maker Sinovel for more than $400 million in damages, alleging that 
Sinovel and its employees gained access to some of its wind turbine 
software codes and used them without authorization.26 This case is only 
the latest in a series of lawsuits that American Superconductor has 
brought against Sinovel.27 
Foreign businesses have identified several IPR enforcement 
problems, such as the lack of coordination among the agencies responsible 
for IP protection and enforcement, local protectionism, inadequate 
personnel training, and insufficient administrative, civil, and criminal 
thresholds for punishment.28 In October 2005, the United States 
requested more information from China regarding IPR infringement 
levels and enforcement activities in order to evaluate China’s efforts to 
improve IPR enforcement since its accession to the WTO.29 China 
provided only limited information in response, and by April 2007 it 
became clear to the United States that bilateral discussions were not 
adequately progressing.30 The United States then decided to file DS362, 
alleging that China had failed to protect IPRs according to TRIPS 
standards. 
 
 21. Weinstein & Fernandez, supra note 13, at 228–29. 
 22. Id. at 229. 
 23. Id. at 230. 
 24. Qin, supra note 13, at 21. 
 25. Id.; Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 2010 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance 5 
(2010) [hereinafter USTR 2010 Report to Congress]; Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 2010 Special 301 
Rep. 19 (2010) [hereinafter USTR 2010 Special 301 Report]; Rogier Creemers, The Effects of WTO 
Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, 31 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 568, 568–59 (2009). 
 26. Leslie Hook, AMSC to Sue Sinovel in Beijing Court, Fin. Times (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/b5e190c8-05db-11e1-a079-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nWzK9xj1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Qin, supra note 13, at 21; see USTR 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 25, at 20–21. 
 29. USTR 2010 Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 85. 
 30. Id. 
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II.  The Claims in WTO Dispute Settlement 362 
A. Criminal Prosecution Thresholds Claim 
The first claim in DS362 involved thresholds for criminal 
infringement. The United States argued that China’s legal thresholds for 
considering infringement to be a criminal offense were too high, 
effectively creating a safe harbor for widespread “commercial scale” 
infringement.31 The United States also alleged that the lack of criminal 
procedures and penalties for commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy 
as a result of the thresholds was inconsistent with China’s obligations 
under Articles 41.1 and 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.32 Article 41.1 deals 
with enforcement of IPRs and mandates that TRIPS members have 
enforcement procedures in place to permit actions against IP infringement, 
including preventative and deterrent remedies.33 Article 61, dealing with 
criminal procedures, provides in part: “Members shall provide for 
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of 
wil[l]ful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale.”34 China established these thresholds through the Criminal Law of 
the PRC and subsequent interpretations by the SPC.35 The trademark 
provisions dealt with the use of a counterfeit trademark, the sale of 
counterfeit trademark commodities, forgery of trademarks, and the sale 
of forged trademarks.36 The copyright provisions involved thresholds for 
criminal copyright infringement and the sale of copyright-infringing 
reproductions.37 
The WTO’s findings were not a clear win for either country. The 
WTO Panel rejected the United States’ claim because the United States 
did not provide sufficient data or evidence for products, markets, or 
other factors that would demonstrate what constituted commercial scale 
in China’s marketplace.38 This rejection illustrates the relatively high 
evidence threshold for WTO challenges under TRIPS Article 61.39 
Namely, the WTO has specified that Article 61 requires a product and 
market-specific demonstration of what constitutes an operation on a 
commercial scale.40 
 
 31. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.482. 
 32. Id. ¶ 3.1. 
 33. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299 (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 34. Id. (emphasis added). 
 35. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 2.2. 
 36. Id. ¶¶ 7.399–.407. 
 37. Id. ¶¶ 7.408–.415. 
 38. Id. ¶ 7.617. 
 39. Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 20. 
 40. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.630. 
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B. Customs Measures Claim 
The second claim involved issues of trademark law and customs 
regulations. The United States argued that Chinese customs regulations 
did not give Chinese customs authorities the power to order disposal of 
infringing goods, which is required by TRIPS.41 Specifically, the United 
States alleged that the requirement in the Chinese customs regulations 
that infringing goods be released into the channels of commerce under 
the circumstances set forth in the regulations is inconsistent with China’s 
obligations under Articles 46 and 59 of TRIPS.42 Articles 46 and 59 both 
deal with remedies and prohibit the removal of a trademark and 
subsequent sale of the confiscated counterfeit good by customs 
authorities.43 
The WTO Panel found in favor of the United States on its customs 
claim. The Panel found that with respect to imports, the way in which 
China’s customs authorities auctioned these goods was inconsistent with 
TRIPS because it permitted the sale of goods after the removal of the 
trademark in more than just exceptional cases.44 While the Panel found in 
favor of the United States by deciding that the simple removal of a 
counterfeited trademark was inconsistent with TRIPS, this finding was 
limited to auctions of products and did not include donations.45 Donation 
of infringing products to charitable organizations, however, is the most 
common disposal method used by Chinese customs authorities.46 Because 
there is no requirement that Chinese customs authorities ensure that 
such donations do not eventually enter the stream of commerce, 
infringing products can re-enter the market.47 
C. Copyright Law Claim 
The third claim exclusively involved issues of copyright law. The 
claim concerned Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, which the 
United States argued denied copyright protection to works prohibited 
for publication or distribution.48 Copyright law in China is the result of 
many compromises among different factions within the legislature.49 One 
such compromise reflected a desire by some within the Chinese 
Communist Party that the Copyright Law be used as a way to control 
 
 41. Id. ¶ 7.197. 
 42. Id. ¶¶ 7.197, 7.254. 
 43. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33, arts. 46, 59. 
 44. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.393. 
 45. Id. ¶ 7.365; Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese Trademark 
Law, 100 Trademark Rep. 964, 1016 (2010). 
 46. Grinvald, supra note 45, at 1016. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 2.4. 
 49. Creemers, supra note 25, at 568. 
Gische_63-HLJ-1393 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:23 PM 
June 2012] REPERCUSSIONS OF CHINA’S HIGH-TECH RISE 1401 
content. This compromise resulted in Article 4, the first sentence of 
which reads: “Works the publication and/or distribution of which is 
prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law.”50 
The claim and resultant WTO findings concerned China’s review 
process for copyright protection, which determines whether the content 
of a work is prohibited under Chinese law on various grounds. Examples 
of such grounds are that a work is against fundamental principles 
established in the Chinese Constitution, that it is of a “superstitious” or 
“immoral” nature, or that it promotes gambling or violence.51 Works or 
portions of works that fail this review process are denied protection 
under the Copyright Law.52 China sought to justify its denial of copyright 
protection for works that did not pass this review process under 
Article 17 of the Berne Convention, incorporated in TRIPS by 
reference.53 Article 17 entitles a government to “permit, to control, or to 
prohibit . . . the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work . . . in 
regard to which the competent authority may find it necessary to exercise 
that right.”54 The WTO Panel disagreed with China’s defense, however, 
and stated that while a government’s rights under Article 17 of the Berne 
Convention may interfere with the exercise of certain rights by the 
copyright holder, a government cannot eliminate all of those rights for a 
particular work via censorship.55 
These conclusions led to a finding in favor of the United States on 
its copyright claim. The Panel found that China’s failure to protect 
copyright in prohibited works that are banned because of their illegal 
content is inconsistent with the Berne Convention as incorporated in 
TRIPS.56 Article 9(1) of TRIPS, which incorporates Article 5(1) of the 
Berne Convention, requires governments to grant copyright protection 
for qualifying works and to have procedures in place to enforce such 
protection.57 The WTO Panel also rejected China’s argument regarding a 
distinction between copyright and copyright protection.58 The Panel 
stated that China did not explain how rights holders would assert any 
type of copyright if protection were denied, which could result in 
copyright becoming a “phantom right.”59 The Panel’s findings in this 
regard pertained only to works that had failed content review and to the 
 
 50. Id. (quoting Copyright Law 2001, supra note 11, art. 4). 
 51. Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 19. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.120. 
 54. Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 19. 
 55. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.127. 
 56. Id. ¶ 7.191. 
 57. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33, art. 9(1). 
 58. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.67. 
 59. Id. 
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deleted portions of works that had been edited to pass content review.60 
The Panel did not find that the United States had made a successful case 
with regard to works that were never submitted for or were in the 
process of content review.61 The Panel concluded by recommending that 
China bring the Copyright Law into compliance with TRIPS.62 
III.  China’s Immediate Compliance with WTO Findings 
China has largely complied with the specific findings of the WTO 
Panel, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) has acknowledged China’s compliance with the WTO rulings.63 
According to the WTO, China provided notice on March 19, 2010, that it 
has successfully implemented the WTO Panel’s recommendations and 
now conformed to WTO law.64 No compliance proceedings have been 
initiated since this notification.65 
China implemented the WTO findings by way of legislative reform. 
China reported that on February 26, 2010, the Standing Committee of 
the Eleventh National People’s Congress approved the amendments to 
the Copyright Law.66 Article 4 of the Copyright Law was amended to 
read, “Copyright holders shall not violate the Constitution or laws or 
jeopardize public interests when exercising their copyright. The State 
shall supervise and administrate the publication and dissemination of 
works in accordance with the law.”67 Additionally, on March 17, 2010, the 
State Council adopted the decision to revise the Regulations for Customs 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights.68 The WTO noted that China 
had therefore completed all necessary domestic legislative procedures for 
implementing the Panel recommendations and rulings.69 
Although on its face it does not seem that the legislative amendment 
will change much in practice, the USTR seems to have accepted China’s 
efforts to implement the Panel recommendations as satisfactory. Because 
China did not appeal and the WTO found in favor of the United States in 
the majority of its claims, the United States obtained at the very least a 
symbolic win. In its latest report, the USTR notes that it “continues to 
monitor China’s implementation of the DSB recommendations and 
 
 60. Id. ¶ 7.103. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. ¶ 8.4. 
 63. USTR 2010 Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 5. 
 64. World Trade Org., supra note 4. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Committee 
of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/cn/cn031en.pdf. 
 68. World Trade Org., supra note 4. 
 69. Id. 
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rulings in this dispute,” but then launches directly into a discussion of a 
subsequent WTO dispute regarding market access barriers.70 The United 
States made its views on these issues clear through this particular dispute 
settlement and then decided to pursue more pressing matters. 
IV.  China’s Identification of and Response to Intellectual 
Property Rights Issues in DS362 
China’s overall IPR development is more nuanced than just its 
legislative efforts in response to DS362. The WTO Panel itself noted that 
it was evaluating only whether certain Chinese measures violated the 
country’s TRIPS obligations, and that it was not tasked with ascertaining 
whether or what level of piracy exists in China, nor reviewing the 
advantages and disadvantages of strict IPR enforcement.71 The latest 
phase of China’s IP development, predominantly occurring within the 
twenty-first century, demonstrates that China has realized that 
globalization requires the protection of its own IP on an international 
stage, in addition to the domestic protection of foreign IP.72 This 
realization has also brought about a shift in China’s IP policy and 
development, from one that was reactive to its international obligations 
to one that is now more proactive and pro-innovation in its approach to 
IP protection and enforcement.73 This shift is likely due to China’s move 
toward a high-tech economy.74 A recent study stated that China is 
expected to pass both the United States and Japan in new patent 
applications.75 Such reports are evidence of China’s increase in research 
and development and the country’s efforts to encourage innovation. 
A prominent example of such a proactive, pro-innovation approach 
is the PRC’s Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy, 
adopted in June 2008. The Outline comprehensively addresses issues of 
IP protection, enforcement, development, and public awareness of 
IPRs.76 One of the driving motivations behind the Outline is to “improve 
China’s capacity for independent innovation and aid in efforts to make 
China an innovative country.”77 The following Subparts discuss ways in 
 
 70. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 2011 Special 301 Report 16 (2011). 
 71. Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 8.5. 
 72. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 3. 
 73. Id. 
 74. For a discussion of China’s move toward creating a high-tech economy, see infra Part V.D; see 
also Keith Bradsher, As China Surges, It Draws High-Tech Researchers from America, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 18, 2010, at A1 (“Companies—and their engineers—are being drawn [to China] more and more 
as China develops a high-tech economy that increasingly competes directly with the United States.”). 
 75. David Barboza, China Poised to Lead World in Patent Filings, N.Y. Times: Economix (Oct. 6, 
2010, 12:14 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/china-poised-to-lead-world-in-patent-
filings/. 
 76. Outline, supra note 7; see Wechsler, supra note 10, at 41–42. 
 77. Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 4. 
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which the Outline and subsequent SPC notices and circulars address the 
issues present in both DS362 and the broader IP fields. 
A. Criminal Prosecution Thresholds: Copyright and Trademark 
As discussed in Part II.A, there is a relatively high evidence threshold 
for WTO challenges under TRIPS Article 61 and what constitutes an 
operation on the level of commercial scale. There are several possible 
remedies to meet this evidence threshold. Scholars have suggested that 
companies in China keep records of IPR infringements and other possible 
WTO violations and provide input to industry associations and 
governments where appropriate.78 Such actions would enable the 
government to better track infringement levels. 
The Outline makes advances in this regard. The Outline calls for the 
development of a national public service platform for basic information 
on IP.79 Furthermore, it calls for the strengthening of the role of 
industrial associations and support of their IP work.80 The Outline 
devotes an entire section to developing IP human resources, calling for 
the establishment of an interdepartmental coordination mechanism and 
accelerated development of national and provincial IP expert databases 
and professional information networks.81 These advancements may 
increase communication about IPRs and enable the PRC to meet its 
obligations post-DS362. 
The SPC materials also make some advances on criminal prosecution 
thresholds. The March 2009 SPC circular, entitled “Opinions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation 
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy,” devotes part of its 
discussion to criminal infringement.82 One goal stated in the circular is 
“[t]o strengthen the judicial protection of intellectual property, 
stringently crack down on criminal infringement on intellectual property 
in accordance with law and fully exert its functions of punishing and 
deterring the criminals.”83 The circular notes that with regard to repeated 
infringements, class infringements, and large-scale piracy, the SPC 
should assist the relevant departments in carrying out “special activities” 
for focused protection.84 Such special activities may include the SPC’s 
plans to unify and regulate conditions and standards for the application 
of criminal punishment. They may also include its aims to safeguard 
 
 78. See, e.g., Bohanes & Emch, supra note 1, at 20. 
 79. Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 52. 
 80. Id. ¶ 56. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 59–62. 
 82. Mar. 29, 2009 SPC Opinion, supra note 9, ¶ 21. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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victims’ rights to pursue criminal prosecution.85 Such aims on behalf of 
the SPC, while not addressing criminal prosecution thresholds 
specifically, suggest a broader policy of continuing to enforce criminal 
prosecution of IP infringement. 
Some scholars, however, are less optimistic about the effect that 
future development of criminal prosecution thresholds will have on 
piracy rates. As discussed in Part II.A, the WTO Panel did not consider 
the evidence sufficient to find in the United States’ favor.86 Moreover, 
even if the WTO Panel had considered the evidence sufficient, changing 
the thresholds might not have had the desired effect.87 In 2007, for 
example, certain enforcement thresholds were halved, but this reduction 
did not cause a drop in piracy rates.88 Furthermore, U.S. copyright 
holders estimate that losses in 2009 due to piracy were approximately 
$3.5 billion for the music recording and software industries alone, and 
these figures indicate little or no overall improvement over the previous 
year.89 Therefore, while national pronouncements may indicate 
intentions to improve in this area, actual improvement may take much 
longer, assuming such pronouncements are implemented and enforced 
and are not just a delay tactic. 
B. Customs Measures: Trademark 
As opposed to the issue of criminal prosecution thresholds, the 
Outline does not focus on the PRC’s customs measures to a great degree. 
The Outline does briefly discuss the issue in its section on improving IP 
law enforcement: 
Customs law enforcement and border protection of intellectual property 
need to be strengthened to maintain order in import and export and 
improve the reputation of China’s export commodities. International 
cooperation in customs law enforcement needs to be fully utilized in 
order to effectively crack down on cross-border illegal acts and crimes 
involving intellectual property. Customs need to have a[n] influence on 
international intellectual property protection.90 
Thus, while the language in the Outline suggests China’s customs 
law enforcement of IPRs needs to be improved, it does not specifically 
address China’s TRIPS-related obligations or the particular problems 
with regard to confiscated counterfeit trademark goods. The PRC seems 
less concerned with this specific aspect of the United States’ case. 
Although the Outline was issued before DS362 was officially decided, 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See supra Part II.A. 
 87. Creemers, supra note 25, at 572. 
 88. Id. 
 89. USTR 2010 Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 5. 
 90. Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 48. 
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the United States filed the complaint over a year prior, so China was 
aware of the specific IPR issues that the United States had raised. It is 
also possible that China chose not to address the TRIPS-related violation 
in the Outline because it feared that doing so might prejudice its position 
in the ongoing WTO dispute. 
The Outline and SPC circulars, however, do devote substantial 
discussion to the overall improvement and enforcement of trademark 
protection. The April 2009 circular contains an entire section focused on 
trademark protection, entitled, “Enhancing the business logo protection, 
actively promoting the development of brand economy, regulating the 
market order, and protecting fair competition.”91 This emphasis on 
promoting the development of a “brand economy,” in particular, is 
consistent with the more proactive, pro-innovation IP approach that 
China has been demonstrating recently. In this circular, the SPC praises 
the market value of well-known brands and pledges to strengthen the 
protection of these brands in accordance with the law.92 The SPC also 
aims to improve judicial policies on trademarks, strengthen the 
protection of trademark rights, and further foster the creation of 
independent brands.93 Additionally, the SPC discusses balancing the 
actual use of registered trademarks and assignments of civil liabilities to 
encourage greater trademark use.94 
Although the Outline and SPC materials do not expressly address the 
customs measures claim from DS362, they do devote substantial attention 
to greater enforcement and protection of trademark rights. This 
significant attention is not only consistent with China’s proactive 
approach, but also bodes well for the future development of China’s brand 
economy and improvements in IP policy with respect to trademark rights. 
C. Copyright Law 
Remedying the copyright issue may take more effort than simply 
rewriting the law. Although the Copyright Law has been amended as a 
result of DS362, the amendment’s real effect on piracy in China may be 
quite small.95 Agreements in the 1990s that resulted in stronger IPR 
legislation in China did not significantly reduce IPR infringement rates.96 
The USTR acknowledged that U.S. copyright holders continue to report 
severe losses due to piracy in China.97 Specifically, trade in pirated optical 
discs is thriving, “[s]mall retail shops continue to be the major commercial 
 
 91. Apr. 21, 2009 SPC Notice, supra note 9, § III. 
 92. Id. ¶ 5. 
 93. Id. ¶ 6. 
 94. Id. ¶ 7. 
 95. Creemers, supra note 25, at 572. 
 96. Id. 
 97. USTR 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 25, at 19. 
Gische_63-HLJ-1393 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:23 PM 
June 2012] REPERCUSSIONS OF CHINA’S HIGH-TECH RISE 1407 
outlets for pirated movies and music,” and the theft of software, books, 
and journals remains concerning.98 Nonetheless, remedying the inherent 
difficulties in Article 4 is important, at least symbolically, because that 
provision serves as the link between copyright law and media control by 
the Chinese government.99 
The Outline takes a mixed approach to the copyright issue. Its 
copyright-specific language focuses on protection of China’s domestic 
IP.100 The Outline proposes to assist the development of copyright-
related industries, but later curbs that general pronouncement by 
pledging to “support the creation of works with clear national features 
and characteristics of the times” and to “assist in the creation of excellent 
cultural works that have difficulties in market competition.”101 Implicit in 
this latter language is China’s continuing prioritization of works that pass 
its content-review process over works that do not. The Outline also 
discusses piracy and the improvement and promotion of the 
commercialization of copyrights.102 With regard to piracy in particular, 
the Outline aims to increase the punishment for piracy and to curb the 
“large-scale production, selling and dissemination of pirated products.”103 
Thus far, bringing Article 4 of the Copyright Law into compliance 
with TRIPS does not necessarily equate to a reduction in copyright 
infringement. This disconnect may be due mainly to enforcement 
problems, which will be discussed in Part V. Additionally, the Outline 
does not prioritize the Article 4 issue present in DS362, and it continues 
to prioritize works that pass its review process without discussion of 
those works that are otherwise prohibited. Finally, the language 
concerning copyright protection seems less nuanced and pronounced 
than the Outline’s parallel language regarding trademark infringement. 
V.  China’s Implementation of IPR Goals in Practice 
Implementation of the IPR goals in the Outline and SPC materials 
is ongoing. Officials from various government bodies including the 
Ministry of Commerce, the State Intellectual Property Office, and the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce jointly pledged at a 
recent news conference to make IPR protection a “long-term” national 
task.104 He Hua, Vice-Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property 
Office, has stated that China has “achieved remarkable progress on the 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Creemers, supra note 25, at 572. 
 100. Outline, supra note 7, ¶ 25. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
 103. Id. ¶ 27. 
 104. Improved IPR Protection to Support Innovation, People’s Daily Online (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7318677.html. 
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strategy during the past two years and more, but there is still much room 
for improvement” and that the country is “strongly committed to 
strengthening efforts on IPR protection to achieve China’s target of 
building itself into an innovation-oriented nation.”105 It is unclear, 
however, to what extent these goals have actually been implemented 
rather than simply pronounced. Since 2008, sixteen departments in China 
have drafted IPR strategy guidelines, and ministries have launched more 
than 400 measures nationwide from 2009 to 2010.106 
A. Law Enforcement in China 
A major obstacle to effective implementation of the IPR goals set 
forth in the Outline is the low quality of Chinese law enforcement. Long 
delays in enforcement actions, in addition to the oftentimes arbitrary and 
nontransparent nature of the actions, are a major complaint of foreign 
companies in China.107 Additionally, local authorities are often the 
primary personnel in the enforcement efforts.108 Because infringing 
enterprises are often an important local source of revenue and 
employment, local authorities may be reluctant to enforce new or more 
stringent IP laws for fear of jeopardizing this revenue source.109 Finally, 
protectionist attitudes, especially among local authorities, can have a 
significant influence on enforcement of IPRs.110 Such protectionist 
tendencies may take substantial time to change, despite the Outline and 
other efforts by the national government. 
The quality of enforcement of IPRs also varies greatly by region. 
For example, Jiangsu Province recently recognized the importance of 
IPR protection by imposing a severe criminal sentence in a high-profile 
software piracy case.111 This same province, which is home to many of the 
world’s leading exporters of electronic equipment, focuses on promoting 
high technology.112 In Guangzhou Province, however, which is also one of 
China’s largest manufacturing regions, counterfeit manufacturing is 
prevalent.113 Fines and penalties are not deterring criminals, and the 
number of criminal IPR cases that are initiated is too low to bring about 
any real improvement in the region.114 The USTR has reported that IPR 
enforcement at the local level is “hampered by poor coordination among 
Chinese government ministries and agencies, local protectionism and 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Weinstein & Fernandez, supra note 13, at 234. 
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corruption, high thresholds for initiating investigations and prosecuting 
criminal cases, lack of training, and inadequate and non-transparent 
processes.”115 
A case involving Baidu, the leading search engine in China,116 is 
illustrative of this law enforcement roadblock. In 2010, Baidu was found 
guilty of violating copyright on music lyrics found on its service.117 
However, the fine was only $8000.118 Such a fine pales in comparison to 
those levied in the United States, such as the $2.4 million fine levied 
against Jammie Thomas-Rasset for pirating twenty-four music tracks.119 
Assessing a mere $8000 fine against a Chinese company that has the vast 
majority of the country’s market share is unlikely to deter future IP 
violations. Thus, inadequate fines and penalties,120 in addition to other 
factors noted above, make ineffective law enforcement a major obstacle 
to full implementation of China’s IPR goals. 
B. Signs of Nascent Pressure from Domestic IP Creators 
Despite problems with law enforcement, there are signs that 
domestic IP creators are beginning to exert some pressure in order to 
protect and enforce their IPRs. The case of Baidu and its e-book system 
is apposite here. Baidu Books121 is a platform built and operated by 
Baidu, which allows web users to browse and download documents and 
other materials from a variety of sources.122 It is similar to Google Books. 
Baidu Books has grown rapidly, and there are now almost 200 million 
different books and materials available.123 The distribution of many of 
these works is not authorized by either the authors or the publishers.124 
 
 115. Id. at 23. 
 116. Kit Eaton, Baidu, Accused Globally of Aiding Piracy, Acts to Quash It in China, Fast 
Company (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.fastcompany.com/1742395/baidu-accused-globally-of-aiding-
piracy-acts-to-quash-it-in-china (“[Baidu] owns about 70% of China’s search market and represents 
the online search connection for hundreds of millions of people.”). 
 117. Kit Eaton, China’s Baidu Rips off Copyrighted Content, Fined Just a Tiny Bit, Fast Company 
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.fastcompany.com/1559701/baidu-copyright-infringement-lyrics-music-legal- 
china-copyright-ip. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Trends in 
Litigation and Economic Damages 2 (NERA Econ. Consulting, Topics in Law and Economics in 
China, Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330619 (“We find that, under the 
administrative systems established in China, penalties and fines for IPR violations generally do not 
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 121. Baidu Books, Baidu, http://wenku.baidu.com (last visited May 1, 2012). 
 122. Hu Yong, Can We Tolerate Baidu’s “Evil” Stand on IP Rights?, China Media Project (Mar. 
25, 2011), http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/03/25/11140. 
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Baidu Books’ copyright violations, however, have not gone 
unnoticed. A “March 15 Letter by Chinese Writers” accused the service 
of violating the rights of writers, stating that Baidu has “stolen our works 
away. They have stolen our rights away. They have stolen our property. 
Baidu Books has become a market for stolen goods.”125 Han Han, 
China’s most popular blogger,126 wrote an open letter to Robin Li, the co-
founder of Baidu.127 Han Han reported Baidu’s alleged response to 
complaints of copyright violations, stating: 
[W]hen the discussions kicked off yesterday, it turned out you sent a 
few arrogant mid-level managers, who from start to finish denied that 
Baidu Library violated any intellectual property rights whatsoever. 
These guys claim that your 2.8 million archived documents, which 
include pretty much every single work ever published in this country, do 
not violate any copyright, that it is your users who upload the content 
and share it with everyone, and that you are merely a platform.128 
Han Han asked Baidu Books to voluntarily respect and protect copyrights, 
so that one day, “Baidu Library will . . . become a source of livelihood for 
Chinese authors, unlike today, where [Baidu Library has] become the 
industry’s enemy and target of public criticism.”129 Such organization by 
Chinese writers in opposition to Baidu, in addition to China’s most 
popular blogger and published author voicing his disapproval, illustrate 
that there is at least some pushback by domestic IP creators in China. 
Baidu’s monopolistic market share, creates difficulties for domestic 
authors attempting to remedy these violations. The China Written Works 
Copyright Society has stated: 
After rights violations by Baidu Books occurred, they might at least 
have come out with a proposal to resolve the issue, actively negotiating 
with Chinese copyright holders, but Baidu’s attitude throughout has 
been cold and indifferent. Baidu has seized on the weakness that while 
China’s copyright laws are in place, they are imperfect and incomplete. 
They are playing a game of words, but have a weak sense of social 
responsibility. They have also seized on this psychology among Chinese 
web users that it’s great for everything to be free.130 
Han Han has recognized the lack of influence that Chinese authors 
have, noting that “many Chinese authors are forced to give away their 
intellectual property for free on Baidu.”131 Furthermore, Han Han explains 
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that these authors have never asked Baidu for a share of the profits and 
have “put up with the insults of Baidu supporters, and the contempt of 
Baidu employees during negotiations.”132 Han Han concludes his plea to 
Robin Li: “You are now the country’s number one entrepreneur. As a 
role model for others, the time has come to make your position known 
on the damage done to the publishing industry by Baidu Library.”133 
Thus, even though domestic IP creators are beginning to voice their 
resistance, change is not automatic. 
Signs of domestic pressure are apparent outside of the Baidu 
context as well. Chinese society may be becoming more litigious, 
especially with respect to IP,134 and Chinese IP owners seem to be less 
hesitant than in the past to enforce their rights against other Chinese 
infringers.135 One report stated that Chinese courts accepted 40% more 
IPR cases in 2010 as companies and individuals increasingly sought legal 
protection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights.136 Interestingly, the 
same report noted that there was little change in the number of cases 
involving foreign entities.137 
This increase in the amount of IP litigation in China is not due to 
the efforts of the United States or other Western countries. Instead, the 
vast majority of IP cases are brought by Chinese companies and 
individuals, not foreign entities.138 For example, of the 23,518 first-
instance IPR civil cases resolved by Chinese courts of law in 2008, only 
1139 involved foreign parties, a rate of about 4.8%.139 One scholar noted 
the “peculiar absence of foreign intellectual property owners as litigants 
among the tens of thousands of cases involving intellectual property 
rights in China.”140 In 2006, of the 14,056 first-instance IPR civil cases 
resolved by Chinese courts of law, only 353 involved foreign parties 
(about 2.5%).141 Therefore, while the percentage of IP cases brought by 
foreign entities is growing, many more cases on the whole are being 
brought by domestic entities: an increase of 8676 cases brought by 
domestic entities from 2006 to 2008, versus an increase of 786 cases 
brought by foreign entities during that time. Domestic IP owners 
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continue to bring more cases each year, illustrating the increasing 
importance of IP and a growing recognition that the legal system can be 
an effective way to enforce their property rights. 
Not only is the amount of IP litigation increasing, but plaintiffs in 
these cases have been more successful than in the past. A summary 
report analyzing trends indicated that for each year between 2006 and 
2009, the plaintiff in an IP dispute could expect to win, at least partially, 
more than 75% of the time.142 This figure includes both “Win Outcomes,” 
or judgments “where the court recogni[z]es some or all of the plaintiff’s 
claims and awards remedies in all of the categories of relief sought by the 
plaintiff (e.g., apology, injunction, damages and costs),”143 and “Partial 
Win Outcomes,” or judgments “where the court recogni[z]es some or all 
of the plaintiff’s claims and awards remedies in some (but not all) of the 
categories of relief sought by the plaintiff (e.g., damages and costs, but no 
apology or injunction).”144 This figure also includes all venues, IPRs, 
causes of action, and industries within the broader civil IP litigation field; 
it analyzes 5506 relevant judgments.145 Therefore, such an increase is yet 
another sign of burgeoning domestic pressure in the IP context, in 
addition to hopefully stronger legal protections and greater awareness of 
IP law within China itself. 
C. International Pressure 
International pressure, specifically from the United States, may also 
help to offset the enforcement roadblock and may ameliorate the state of 
IP enforcement in China. The United States took notice of Baidu’s IP 
violations and as a result, the USTR listed Baidu as a key member on its 
list of global counterfeit-assisting services.146 Baidu reacted to these 
complaints and issued anti-piracy technology for Baidu Books shortly 
thereafter.147 
Han Han has noted this discrepancy between Baidu’s IP violations—
and the subsequent response within China—and the image it seeks to 
project externally, especially to the United States. Han Han explains in 
his letter to Robin Li: 
[Y]ou must be aware what would happen if tomorrow you would 
launch “Baidu America”, and then make all books and music 
published in the US available for free. You won’t do that, and you 
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won’t tell the American people that you’re merely a platform either, 
that it has nothing to do with you, that it’s the users uploading the 
content, and that the spirit of the internet is sharing. It is precisely 
because you know this that today you have only set up shop in China. 
You also know who can be bullied, and who cannot.148 
Even though Baidu has thus far been able to create and run a 
service within China that violates the rights of Chinese IP holders, 
presumably such a system would not thrive in the United States. In 2009, 
when Google Books was condemned by Chinese writers for the 
unauthorized scanning of Chinese works, the China Written Works 
Copyright Society held three separate discussions with Google to remedy 
the situation,149 and Google issued a formal apology and proposed a 
mediation payment scheme.150 Baidu Books could learn from Google’s 
efforts to appease the demands of Chinese IP creators, and pressure from 
the United States may help to reduce IPR infringement problems. 
The United States has pressured China in other IP-related contexts. 
In October 2010, the State Council launched a six-month campaign to 
reduce the number of pirated goods and to strengthen patent, trademark, 
and copyright protection on a range of goods made both in China and 
abroad.151 This campaign began just before President Hu Jintao’s state visit 
to the United States in January 2011 and was one of the government’s 
most intensive IPR protection initiatives to date.152 Regardless of China’s 
motivations for launching the campaign, Chinese officials investigated over 
45,000 cases of IPR violations.153 While the campaign may not be strong 
evidence of systemic change or improvement, it did result in positive 
implications for the state of IPRs in China, at least in the short-term. 
D. Changes in China’s Domestic Economy 
China’s move toward a high-tech economy might do more to foster 
IPR protection than could any international pressure that China faces. 
Politburo Standing Committee Member He Guoqiang recently called for 
“greater efforts to develop new high-tech industries . . . to accelerate the 
transformation” of China’s economy.154 In the past few years, Shanghai 
has intensified its efforts to develop high-tech industries, including 
developing nine specific high-tech sectors such as clean energy and civil 
aviation manufacturing.155 He Guoqiang has stated that “enhancing 
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innovative capacity is the key to changing the way China’s economy 
operates.”156 
Shanghai is just one example of increasing technological innovation 
throughout the country. U.S. companies are drawn to China as it 
develops a high-tech economy that increasingly competes with the 
United States; a few American companies are even making deals with 
Chinese companies to license Chinese technology.157 China is the world’s 
largest market for automobiles and desktop computers, and the country 
also has the most Internet users.158 
This emphasis on greater technological innovation bodes well for 
China’s IPR regime. As China innovates and develops its own domestic 
IP, the country will want to protect such innovation. A recent Chinese 
news article stated that “innovation and resulting IP will increasingly 
serve as core elements of China’s economic development,” and that “the 
rule of law is crucial to China’s drive for greater scientific and 
technological innovation.”159 The article also outlined the view that 
China’s current priority is research and development, and that China is 
committed to protecting its assets with its evolving IP system.160 Recent 
statistics support such a view: In 2009, China spent 543.3 billion Yuan on 
R&D, a 17.7% increase over 2008; by the end of 2009, 1,193,000 of the 
1,520,000 total patents registered in China were domestic.161 China Law 
Blog listed “stepped up IP enforcement” as one of the top business law 
trends in China for 2010, explaining that for technology licensing 
agreements to have premium value to Chinese companies that enter into 
them, there must be adequate IPR enforcement within China.162 
President Hu Jintao has himself stressed the importance of IP protection 
for Chinese companies: “Nowadays, the competition in information 
technology is extremely fierce. I hope you, as a software company, will 
treasure technological innovation as your life. You need to own 
intellectual property rights for your products. I hope you will be pioneers 
in the development of our country’s software industry.”163 As China 
innovates, its protection of IPRs will improve as well. 
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Conclusion 
The PRC’s Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy 
and subsequent SPC notices and circulars indicate that China has shifted 
to a more proactive and pro-innovation IP policy, beyond merely 
responding to WTO accession obligations. This overall shift is likely due 
to China’s increasing emphasis on innovation and creating a high-tech 
economy.164 
Although China has adopted the WTO Panel’s findings in DS362, 
the Outline and SPC notices do not explicitly address all of the issues 
raised. In particular, the link between copyright protection and media 
control implicit in Article 4 of the Copyright Law is not adequately 
addressed in any of these materials. This is a contentious issue for China 
and is likely to cause much internal dissent. Additionally, implementation 
of the goals in the Outline and SPC materials still faces roadblocks, such as 
problems regarding law enforcement. Increasing pressure from domestic 
IP creators within China, in addition to continued pressure from the 
United States and continued changes in China’s economy, may slowly 
remedy these IPR violations. 
The United States’ claims in DS362 were the result of extensive 
lobbying by U.S. copyright and trademark holders, who claimed that 
they were losing a substantial part of the potential Chinese market to 
pirated or counterfeited products.165 Without substantial change in China, 
the U.S. government will continue to face pressure to initiate claims 
against China.166 Hopefully, the implementation of the Outline and SPC 
notices will remedy many of the issues present in DS362 and will foster 
greater cooperation between the United States and China in the IP 
arena, especially as the two countries’ economies become increasingly 
connected and China continues its high-tech rise. 
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